By Scott Lemke | July 15, 2026
Election officials, including a Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), are not categorically immune from civil claims merely because they are exercising authority under their governing legislation.
In Resler v. Anglin, 2026 SCC 23, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) permitted a civil claim that was brought by an unsuccessful candidate after the 2015 general election to proceed against Alberta’s CEO .
Background
The plaintiff, Mr. Anglin, was a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) of Alberta from 2012 to 2015. In 2015, Mr. Anglin lost his re-election bid. During the campaign, the CEO caused at least 25 of Mr. Anglin’s signs to be removed on the basis that they identified him as an incumbent “MLA” after the election had been called, and that the sponsorship information on the signs fell below the size prescribed by the Election Act’s guidelines.
Additionally, the CEO fined Mr. Anglin after an investigation found that he had failed to protect an electors’ list in his possession.
Mr. Anglin, while accepting the outcome of the election, sought judicial review of the CEO’s actions. After his pursuit of judicial review proceedings largely failed, Mr. Anglin commenced a civil action against the CEO seeking $1.2 million in damages (plus an additional $1M in punitive damages), including damages for the lost chance of re-election.
The CEO brought a motion to strike Mr. Anglin’s claim and was successful at the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (as it then was).
Mr. Anglin appealed, and the Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the claim, except for the allegation of malicious prosecution. The CEO then appealed to the SCC.
SCC Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and allowed Mr. Anglin’s claim to proceed. Justice Moreau, writing for the majority, rejected the four alleged barriers to the claim proceeding: collateral attack, abuse of process, parliamentary privilege, and statutory immunity.
First, the claim was not a collateral attack on the election result because Mr. Anglin accepted the election outcome and was not seeking to void the election or alter the composition of the Legislative Assembly. He sought damages for alleged misconduct in the administration of the election.
Second, the claim was not an abuse of process. The earlier proceedings did not determine whether the CEO had knowingly misused his public powers to harm Mr. Anglin’s campaign. The civil claim therefore raised issues that had not already been finally determined.
Third, parliamentary privilege did not bar the claim. Although the Legislative Assembly has authority over its own composition and core legislative functions, Mr. Anglin’s claim did not challenge who was entitled to sit or vote in the Assembly, nor was the CEO’s alleged misconduct sufficiently connected to a protected legislative function.
Fourth, statutory immunity under s. 5.1(1) of the Alberta Election Act did not bar the claim at the pleadings stage. The immunity provision protects acts done in good faith in the exercise or purported exercise of statutory powers. Mr. Anglin specifically alleged bad faith. The Court did not find that bad faith had been proven; it held that the pleaded allegation of bad faith was sufficient to prevent the immunity clause from defeating the claim on a motion to strike.
Having rejected those barriers, Justice Moreau concluded that the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action for misfeasance in public office.
It important to remember that this was a pleadings decision on a motion to strike. The decision should not be read as a finding that the CEO acted unlawfully. The Court accepted the pleaded facts as true only for the purpose of assessing whether the claim could avoid being struck at the pleadings stage.